This decade was marked by a complex, multidimensional milieu of sectarian violence, ethnic militancy, political instability, the evolution of Al-Qaida and its affiliates, the birth and growth of jihadi organisations, and many other violence-prone developments which adversely affected society and severely impacted Pakistan. The positive highlight of this era was the nuclear test of 28th May 1998, changing the geo-strategic landscape of South Asia forever. However, this period culminated with the imposition of Martial Law by General Pervez Musharraf on 12th October 1999.
1988 was a watershed year for Pakistan. Within the country, a massive explosion occurred at the Ojheri ammunition depot near Rawalpindi on 10th April 1988. This incident contributed to increasing differences between General Zia and PM Junejo, resulting in the dismissal of the government on 29th May 1988. Then, General Zia died in a plane crash on 17th August 1988. This was followed by the general elections held on 16th November 1988, after 11 years, handing over a truncated government to PM Benazir Bhutto. Internationally, “The Geneva Peace Accords” for Afghanistan were signed on 14th April 1988, primarily focused on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and putting an end to the Afghan Jihad. This Soviet humiliation led to the demise of the Soviet Empire, positioning the USA as the sole superpower.
Pakistan was least prepared, without any plan or policy of what to do with the fighters of the Afghan Jihad. General Zia’s death led to a power vacuum, which could not be filled by the incoming secular-minded PPP government. The menace of Kalashnikovs, drugs, ill-got wealth, and factors mentioned above had transformed the society. And the biggest impact was on the sectarian tapestry.
The Shia-Sunni conflict grew exponentially. The Gilgit massacre of 1988 marked the beginning of organised anti-Shia violence. In the same year, Allama Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini, leader of Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, was killed in Peshawar, leading to amplified militancy in Shia organisations. Although no organisation claimed explicit credit, it is believed that Shia militants assassinated Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of SSP, on 22nd February 1990 in Jhang. As a result, Jhang became the epicentre of the SSP, whose more militant offshoot was created in 1996 and named as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Zia ur Rehman Farooqi was killed in a bomb blast on 19th January 1997 at the Lahore Sessions Court, and Azam Tariq, who became the leader of SSP later on, was injured.
In a first, on 19th December 1990, Sadeq Ganji, the director of Khana-e-Farhang Lahore, was murdered in Lahore. Despite being a diplomat of a friendly country, he was targeted because of being an Iranian Shia. His murderer, Sheikh Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, associated with the SSP, was arrested in 1991 and after a protracted trial, was hanged to death on 28th February 2001. This incident became a serious diplomatic issue between Pakistan and Iran. Iran took this incident as a perceived lack of control by Pakistan on the militant anti-Shia groups and also thought that it was influenced by the regional geopolitics between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
This all led to unthinkable sectarian violence. Imambargahs, mosques, professionals, madrassahs—no place or person was off-limits. The killing spree continued in all the provinces, with Punjab and Sindh facing the brunt. Hundreds of Pakistanis died, mostly innocents, who had no idea why they were being killed. Security of the Muharram processions became a nightmare for the law enforcement agencies. This also led to further fractures between the Sunni sects. Barelvis, who are a majority in Pakistan and are generally peaceful, were also affected as they were also killed in this mayhem. Minorities also suffered as collateral damage. Thus, once you look back to what happened to our people and our country, it is shocking, to say the least.
The government’s response was generally muted. With musical chairs being played between PML(N) and PPP, and the state institutions playing an active role in this game of thrones, the required policy, planning, and execution were absent. Bureaucracy was divided and officers who were acceptable in the political corridors were the favourites, irrespective of their professional acumen. It was like a horror movie in which the actors were writing their death warrants. And Muslims and Pakistanis continued to die across Pakistan.
In my opinion, besides the precious lives lost, the divorce between the Shias and the Sunnis has had a much larger impact on Pakistan. Shias and Sunnis had been living in the Indian subcontinent for centuries. They would intermarry, make the arrangements for Muharram, Sunnis would put up sabeels for the processions, and it was normal for a family to be part-Shia and part-Sunni. But a lasting impact of the sectarian violence which commenced in the 1980s and gained traction from 1988, resulted in the vaporising of this bonhomie. The thought that we are different from each other seeped into the consciousness of the common people. This thought became prevalent even within the children, which is extremely unfortunate. And the Shias faced the brunt of this violence. Many Shia professionals left Pakistan because of the fear, leaving us poorer.
The ethnic and transnational terrorism during this decade merits a different column, which will be written next. As far as sectarian terrorism is concerned, 1988–1999 set the stage, very adversely affecting the fabric of our society, which was normal as any other society, before the onset of this menace. Although in the last few years, sectarian violence has diminished, the psychological, social, and inter-sect disharmony persists. And a potent reminder of this malaise is the nearly zero Sunni-Shia intermarriages and other social and cultural commonalities.